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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF
LAWYERS"
Paul Gonsont
Professor Langevoort and I go back some fifteen years or
more when we worked together on the staff of the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). A young lawyer with a
keen intellect, Professor Langevoort played an important role
in fashioning the development of insider trading doctrine at
the SEC and in the courts. As an academic, he has written and
spoken well on this topic, as well as on other topics. I have
followed his career with admiration. Recently, he, together
with other well-known lawyers and academics in securities
law, filed a friend of the court brief with the United States
Supreme Court supporting the government's position in a very
important insider trading case that will be argued next
Wednesday. 1
I would first like to say a few words about questions of
independence of lawyers in institutions other than law firms
and companies, and I focus on the SEC and law schools. While
* 01997 Paul Gonson. All Rights Reserved. This paper was prepared by Paul
Gonson on February 17, 1998, for inclusion in an issue of the Broolyn Law
Reuiew to contain the address of ProE Langevoort on April 10, 1997 and comments
of three commentators (The Pomerantz Lecture). Mr. Gonson was one of those
commentators, and this paper is based on an edited version of an audiotape of
Mr. Gonson's remarks, which were delivered from notes.
t 11r. Gonson is the Solicitor of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
Washington, D.C. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy,
disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its
employees. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of
the Commission, or the members of the staff of the Commission. Mr. Goason was
counsel for the Commission in the cases discussed herein.
1 Subsequently, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government,
upholding the validity of the misappropriation theory of insider trading under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, and the validity of SEC Rule 14e-3 under the Exchange Act,
concerning insider trading in tender offers. U.S. v. OHagen, 117 S. CL 2199
(1997).
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my day job is that of a lawyer at the SEC, for many years I
have taught law as an adjunct professor at Georgetown
University Law Center in Washington, D.C. I come in one
evening a week and enjoy the interaction with the students
and the discipline it imposes on me to stay current in my field.
Law schools and the SEC operate in environments and
have cultures that bear importantly on how would-be lawyers
and younger lawyers will act with respect to independence. In
this context, I do not mean independence in the way auditors
must be independent by, for example, not owning stock in their
client. I am talking about independence of judgment, as
Professor Langevoort has eloquently spoken about it.
All law schools have cultures and, whatever they are, they
transmit them to the students. Some years ago, I attended a
Georgetown faculty retreat and listened to strong views on all
sides about critical legal studies and the writings of Professor
Duncan Kennedy of Harvard Law School. The Georgetown
faculty was acknowledging that the law school was an
acculturating experience for students and were debating how
to intentionally focus that experience. I taught a seminar on
professional responsibility in corporate and securities practice
in the graduate division at Georgetown. In addition to teaching
the rules, I saw my role as imbuing my students with the idea
they should aspire to high standards of personal integrity and
ethical conduct in their law practices. Sometimes I thought
that the students took my course just to find out how to keep
out of trouble. Still, I felt it important to try to transmit a
culture of high standards.
I am very proud of the SEC's culture concerning
independence of lawyers and the integrity of the staff
generally. A few years ago, Lloyd Cutler, a prominent
Washington, D.C. lawyer, was counsel to President Clinton. In
that capacity, he gave the keynote address to a national
convention sponsored by the U.S. Office of Government Ethics.
The audience was several hundred ethics officials from
government departments and agencies. During the course of
his remarks, he referred to the SEC. He said, "You never hear
of taking an SEC lawyer to lunch." He observed that the
tradition of integrity in that agency was so ingrained that the
SEC could be counted on to do the right thing without having
to have a written code. The SEC does have a code of conduct in
[Vol. 63: 685
THE INDEPENDENCE OF LAWYERS
common with other agencies. But his point was, of course, that
what the culture ingrains is more important than what a code
requires. I was in that audience and was very proud of my
agency.
Recently, the Inspector General at the SEC conducted a
study of the SEC's integrity program. He submitted an audit
report based on interviews conducted in workshops in which
over 200 staff at all levels participated in headquarters and in
the field offices. The report states:
Perhaps the most noteworthy finding was that, with almost no
exceptions, the participants also indicated that they felt a personal
sense of responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the
Commission. Most of the participants also indicated that they felt a
strong sense of an ethical tradition at the Commission and that the
staff live up to the Commission's integrity expectations
How does that ethical tradition get transmitted in the SEC
to a staff that is constantly turning over? Let me give you a
personal example. I was told not to tell war stories. This is not
a war story; it is an example.
Many years ago, as a young lawyer at the SEC, I attended
a meeting of the Commission. You can visualize this: There is
a big round table in a large room with many chairs around it.
The five presidentially-appointed Commissioners, who
collectively constitute the head of the agency, sit at one side of
the table. They have an agenda of matters to be considered at
that meeting, much like a judge has a docket of matters at a
motion calendar. As the Chairman calls the next agenda item,
the relevant staff come forward and sit at the other side of the
table. Usually an active discussion take place.
My matter was a minor one. Someone had made a
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA) request for some
documents. Under the FOIA, any person can obtain documents
from a federal agency unless an exemption is available which
permits the agency to withhold them. At the SEC, some of the
2 Audit Report No. 250, Office of Inspector General, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Exchange Excellence: The Commission's Culture & Tradition of Staff
Conduct 1 (January 22, 1997). The Report states: 'Over 200 SEC staff and
managers participated in one of sixteen structured workshops. Workshops were
grouped with respect to where participants worked (e.g., headquarters versus
regions) and their role (e.g., professional versus support versus management.) Id.
at 2.
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exemptions used to withhold documents, for example, relate to
ongoing nonpublic law enforcement investigations, trade secret
information obtained from companies, and sensitive financial
information from financial institutions. But, in this FOIA
matter at the Commission table, there was no exemption so far
as the staff could see, and thus no basis upon which the agency
could deny the request, and we said so.
It was clear to the staff that some of the Commissioners
did not want the documents given out because they were
embarrassing. My boss made a policy argument to the
Commissioners. Suppose, he said, a brokerage firm regulated
by the SEC had this attitude. They didn't like an SEC rule, so
they decided they would not comply with it. He said that the
SEC wants to foster a culture in the securities industry of
compliance with the law; so we, no less, as the government,
must comply with the law.
Well, one of the Commissioners still was not moved. He
said, do not give him the documents. If he sues us, and the
court says give them to him, then we will give them to him.
My boss responded that there was no valid basis to deny
the requestor the documents, nor was there a valid basis to
defend against an FOIA lawsuit. He pointed out that a lawyer
may not make an argument or assert a defense in court unless
there is an arguable basis for it, and here, none existed.
When asked by the Commission what his position would
be if he were directed to withhold the documents, he replied
that he hoped that he would not be put in that position, but if
he were, he would resign.
Goodness! Shocks and tremors in that room.
To its credit, the Commission authorized the release of the
documents.
Later, we went back to my boss's office and talked about
this event, important in my life, as I suppose it was in his. We
asked him, weren't you scared? He said that, yes, he was, a
little, but he had faith the matter would come out the way it
did. He also said that he is paid to give his best advice, not to
tell the agency heads merely what they want to hear. If he is
off base too many times, then he should be fired, or resign. But
he prospered in the agency and eventually retired as a highly
regarded senior lawyer.
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You can guess how many times over the years I have told
that story to young lawyers, and to new Commissioners. And
on the rare occasion when a comparable issue arises, I tell the
story at a Commission meeting. You know how we lawyers like
precedent. So I say, this is the way we do it at the SEC. And
everyone agrees.
That same boss had a policy of letting lawyers disagree
with the Office of General Counsel's recommendations to the
Commission in a written memorandum or even at an oral
presentation at the Commission table. But he wanted those
disagreements reserved for the really important issues.
One day I went to a Commission meeting and orally
disagreed with him, and he later yelled at me. I was surprised.
Didn't you say that was OK?, I asked. He replied that he was
not yelling at me because I took a position different from his.
He was yelling at me for my bad judgment in doing so. I asked,
aren't you giving with one hand and taking away with the
other?
I thought about it later and decided he was right. He gave
permission for junior staff lawyers to think and act with
independence. But one cannot scream all day long. One has to
pick and choose those few matters that are really important.
At the SEC we are also concerned with the conduct of
lawyers who appear and practice before us when that conduct
can adversely affect the integrity of our own processes. While
we expect zealous representation, we also hope lawyers will
exercise a degree of independent judgment. Lawyers like to tell
us at the SEC that we overestimate their ability to persuade
their clients. Well, we like to tell them that they
underestimate the clout they have with their clients.
In In re William R. Carter and Charles J. Johnson over
fifteen years ago, the SEC spoke to the independence of
lawyers in a difficult situation with their client.3 That case
involved a company named National Telephone, and illustrates
Professor Langevoort's observations that some persons in
management are eternally optimistic and exercise business
judgment not always consonant with their disclosure
obligations under the federal securities laws. National
IIn re William R. Carter and Charles J. Johnson, Jr., 1981-82 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,827 (SEC Feb. 28, 1981).
1997]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Telephone Company was in the telephone leasing business and
doing well. But the more leases they wrote, the more funds
they needed in order to buy those telephones, yet funds would
not be internally generated until the lease payments were
made. The company was not able to secure adequate financing
either from a public offering or from lenders.
At some point, the company had to disclose that their
lenders had cut off their credit and no new leases could be
written. But the president of the company believed that the
situation would get better and if this funding crisis were
disclosed publicly, all the salesman would leave. The
company's outside lawyers strongly advised disclosure, but the
company refused, and adequate disclosure was not made.
When the SEC discovered this, it brought law enforcement
proceedings against the company and its president. It also
brought an administrative disciplinary proceeding against the
company's lawyers. When lawyers find themselves with a
strong willed client who is not taking their advice and not
making proper disclosure, some lawyers will say that is the
time to resign. In the course of its opinion, the SEC
emphasized that lawyers should stay with such a hard nosed
client and consider resignation only as a last option. The
Commission said:
Some have argued that resignation is the only permissible course
when a client chooses not to comply with disclosure advice. We do
not agree. Premature resignation serves neither the end of an
effective lawyer-client relationship nor, in most cases, the effective
administration of the securities law. The lawyer's continued
interaction with his client will ordinarily hold the greatest promise
of corrective action. So long as a lawyer is acting in good faith, and
exerting reasonable efforts to prevent violations of the law by his
client, his professional obligations have been met. In general, the
best result is that which promotes the continued, strong-minded and
independent participation by the lawyer.4
" Id. S 84,172-73. The commission went on to say:
We recognize, however, that the "best result" is not always obtainable,
and that there may occur situations where the lawyer must conclude that
the misconduct is so extreme or irretrievable, or the involvement of his
client's management and board of directors in the misconduct is so
through-going and pervasive that any action short of resignation would
be futile. We would anticipate that cases where a lawyer has no choice
but to resign would be rare and of egregious nature.
Id. 84,173 (footnote omitted).
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Another factor bearing on the independence of lawyers,
alluded to by previous commentators, is that lawyers play
different roles. A case on point is SEC v. Fehn, decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where
the court was critical of the two different roles of the lawyer
involved.5
In that case, the SEC sued a securities lawyer with over
twenty-five years experience and obtained an injunction
against him for a violation of the antifraud provisions, which
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Mr. Fehn's role at the start was
that of a defense lawyer, but he got in trouble as a disclosure
lawyer. He had been retained to represent a company and its
president in connection with a formal SEC investigation of the
company's initial public offering. During the course of the in-
vestigation, Mr. Fehn oversaw the preparation of three Form
1O-Qs that were filed with the SEC. The president refused to
make certain disclosures of matters concerning him that were
a subject of the SEC investigation, and Mr. Fehn omitted them
from the Form 10-Qs. Mr. Fehn later testified that he told the
president that disclosure was required, but that disclosure
could impair the ability of the president to assert his privilege
against self-incrimination with respect to these earlier viola-
tions. The SEC sued Mr. Fehn for aiding and abetting the
company's false filings. The district court and the court of ap-
peals rejected Mr. Fehn's Fifth Amendment argument on the
merits.
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit spoke to the role of disclo-
sure counsel:
We observe, furthermore, that effective regulation of the issuance
and trading of securities depends, fundamentally, on securities law-
yers such as Fehn properly advising their clients of the disclosure
requirements and other relevant provisions of the securities regula-
tions. Securities regulation in this country is premised on open dis-
closure, and it is therefore incumbent upon practitioners like Fehn
to be highly familiar with the disclosure requirements and to insist
that their clients comply with them.
" SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 59
(1997).
r Id. at 1293.
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The Court discussed the potential for difficulty when a
lawyer simultaneously acts as defense and disclosure counsel
for a public company:
We acknowledge the inherent tension between representing a client
in criminal or civil litigation-which entails professional obligations
such as the duty of confidentiality and the need to advise clients of
their privilege against self-incrimination-and counseling a client in
connection with regulatory compliance ....
This dilemma is especially pronounced in cases where, as here,
a lawyer attempts to represent a client in an SEC investigation of
previous disclosure violations and, at the same time, attempts to
advise that same client as to ongoing disclosure' requirements ....
We express no opinion as to whether Fehn's representation of
Wheeler and CTI in connection with the SEC compliance was "com-
patible" with counseling these same parties about with SEC disclo-
sure requirements. What is clear, however, is that the SEC disclo-
sure requirements mandated disclosure of Wheeler's role as CTI's
promoter and of the contingent liabilities stemming from CTI's and
Wheeler's earlier securities law violations. In failing to make the
Form 10-Qs comply with these disclosure requirements, Fehn 'sub-
stantially assist[ed]' in the primary disclosure violations.!
Independence of the lawyer is made more difficult by the
at-will employment doctrine. Generally, that doctrine says that
in absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, employment
may be terminated at the will of the employer for any reason
or for no reason at all. The corporate lawyer faced with client
misconduct must navigate between difficult ethical obligations
including not counselling a client to violate the law nor assist-
ing the client in conduct known to the lawyer to be criminal or
fraudulent, while exercising independent legal judgment. She
must also be concerned about being called to task by bar disci-
plinary authorities concerned with preservation of client confi-
dences as well as with government watchers like the SEC and
federal bank regulators who may want to know about her
client's misconduct. If she does the right thing, she must worry
about being fired and becoming a pariah in her industry and in
the bar. And does she have a wrongful termination claim in
7 Id. at 1293-95.
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tort? In most jurisdictions, the answer is probably not because
the notion that the client can select its own lawyer, even corpo-
rations when they are dissatisfied with their in-house lawyers,
is so fundamental.
When a client determines to follow a course of improper or
illegal conduct, despite the lawyer's advice to the contrary, the
lawyer must possess a rigid backbone to stand up to that cli-
ent.
Professor Langevoort's paper is an important work in
helping corporate and securities lawyers understand the forces
that play on their perception of their independence. I am flat-
tered and feel privileged, having been called upon to make
these comments.

